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The Google Book Search Settlement: A New 
Orphan-Works Monopoly? 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
Google is a company of modest ambitions. As it puts it in its brief 
corporate statement, Google’s mission is to “organize the world’s 
information and make it universally accessible and useful.”1 
Organize it, put it online, display it and make a few dollars at the 
same time. Google’s Book Search is a core piece of this vision. 
Think of the world’s great libraries, all merged into one collection 
and all available online through any device connected to the 
Internet. Universal access indeed. 
But creating such a wonder isn’t a simple undertaking. Books 
have to be found, bought or borrowed and copied. The resulting 
digital files need to be sliced and diced to make them as useful as 
possible but also preserved so that looking at books online is very 
much like looking at them offline. This is a substantial technical 
undertaking, plus we need to figure out a business model for 
accessing the books. In the past—and still today of course—
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individuals purchased books or borrowed them from libraries, who 
in turn had purchased the books. Will digital copies be purchased 
in the same fashion or will different rules apply? Were these 
technical and economic challenges not enough, we would confront 
the really hard problem, namely, how do we match an 18th century 
legal system with early 21st century opportunities? 
Google moved forward nonetheless. That in turn led two 
lawsuits and an eventual settlement agreement that will be 
considered at a fairness hearing in federal district court on June 11, 
2009. The settlement agreement2 is exceedingly complex—though 
not obviously unnecessarily so—as befits an agreement that will 
create an extraordinary new platform for accessing books. 
Successful new book platforms are rare—since Gutenberg have 
there been any?—and Google’s is of breathtaking ambition. 
This paper considers some of the antitrust and competition 
policy issues raised by the settlement agreement. The paper itself is 
divided into five sections. Section I provides brief background to 
the creation of Google Book Search and the lawsuits that emerged. 
Section II sets out five quick situations—hypotheticals, as we call 
them in law school—to try to establish some antitrust bearings to 
help us triangulate on the settlement agreement. 
Section III sets out some of the salient features of the 
settlement agreement. Absent the lawsuit by the Authors Guild, 
the settlement agreement would be nothing more than a private 
contract between Google and individual rightsholders with both 
horizontal and vertical components. The lawsuit doesn’t change 
that essentially though it does have the key consequence of 
bringing so-called orphan works within the agreement. These are 
works that remain within copyright but that are stuck in limbo: the 
rightsholder for the book can’t be identified or, if identifiable, can’t 
be tracked down. That means that it isn’t possible to license access 
                                                
2 The official settlement agreement website is at 
http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/ and Google’s discussion is available at 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/. 
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to the work. You can’t contract with people you can’t identify or 
find.  
That takes us to two antitrust/competition policy issues and 
then to a key question of timing and comparative institutional 
advantage. First, the settlement agreement implements a pricing 
algorithm for single-copy access to digital books that I think is 
questionable. This is a joint agreement among rightsholders with 
Google as to how Google will price online access to their works 
going forward. Rightsholders can choose to appoint Google as 
their agent for pricing online access to consumers where Google 
will seek to maximize revenues for each book. That isn’t the result 
that would emerge under pure competition between 
authors/rightsholders and seems likely to run afoul of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. 
Second, as currently configured, the settlement agreement 
creates unique access for Google to orphan works. This emerges 
directly from the court’s presence. Absent the lawsuit by the 
Authors Guild, Google and interested rightsholders could have 
crafted a deal very much like that in the settlement agreement and 
would have implemented that through private contracts. That deal, 
of course, would be subject to antitrust scrutiny, as it would involve 
large numbers of otherwise competing rightsholders contracting 
together with Google. That wouldn’t be unprecedented—we have 
similarly complex arrangements for other copyright collectives like 
ASCAP and BMI—but definitely worth antitrust attention (70 
years worth for our music cooperatives). 
But with the lawsuit and the opt-out class action, we have left 
the world of purely-private contracts. For some rightsholders, that 
change is just a bother: they wouldn’t have had to sign a private 
deal and could have done nothing but now must affirmatively opt 
out of the settlement. But for our orphan rightsholders, the change 
in default positions is everything. The orphans holders can’t act 
and the settlement agreement neatly sweeps them up to give 
Google releases for the ongoing use of their works. The settlement 
agreement solves this problem for Google, but only for Google, in 
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creating a carefully-crafted license for Google to use those works. 
The great accomplishment of the settlement is precisely in the way 
that it uses the opt-out class action to sidestep the orphan works 
problem. But, as has been noted elsewhere,3 this gives Google an 
initial monopoly—and possibly a long-running one—over the use 
of the orphan works. This emerges directly from the court’s role in 
this case because, again, the settlement agreement between Google 
and active rightsholders could have been implemented as a private 
matter without a lawsuit, though, again, with perhaps substantial 
antitrust attention. But the lawsuit is the device by which the 
initial orphan works monopoly is created: without the lawsuit, 
Google would acquire no rights to use the orphan works. 
The way to prevent the creation of the market power that will 
arise directly from the court’s role in approving the settlement 
would be to modify the settlement agreement by expanding the 
licenses created under it. I consider this issue in Section IV. I think 
that there are strong reasons to think that the license created by the 
settlement agreement should be expanded so as to mitigate the 
market power that the court’s approval of the settlement agreement 
will otherwise create. The most natural hook for this substantively 
would be the agreement’s most-favored nations clause (3.8(a)), 
which currently runs only in favor of Google. A more symmetric 
MFN would create a going-forward licensing mechanism for other 
entities to license the works of the active rightsholders as well to 
use the orphan works. 
But I do think that there is a timing issue on that. Without real 
parties before the court on this, we are just shadowboxing. I don’t 
know that I would modify the MFN clause in the abstract; we 
should probably wait instead until we have an actual case before us. 
                                                
3 James Gibson, Google’s New Monopoly?, The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 2008, 
p.A21; James Grimmelmann, How to Improve the Google Book Search Settlement, 
Journal of Internet Law, April, 2009 (online at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=james_grimmelman
n); Robert Darnton, Google & the Future of Books, New York Review of Books, Feb. 
12, 2009 (online at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22281). 
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The settlement agreement provides that the court will retain 
jurisdiction over it going forward. That jurisdiction needs to 
include the possibility that other parties can subsequently come to 
court and seek licenses. Another possibility is to ensure that the 
Registry has the power to issue licenses going forward. And there 
is a plausible reading of the settlement agreement that suggests 
that the Registry is intended to have the authority to license the 
orphan works to third parties. 
There is a second timing question and I consider that in 
Section V. A standard fairness hearing for a class-action settlement 
doesn’t begin to look anything like an antitrust inquiry. There will 
be no effort to define markets or any effort to inquire 
systematically into the likely market effects of a settlement. 
Fairness hearings often will just focus on what the proposed 
settlement means for the direct parties to the litigation, but even 
courts that consider more factors, including a public interest factor, 
are unlikely to conduct a searching antitrust inquiry. The fairness 
hearing will also not come close to matching the business review 
process undertaken by the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice when parties want some level of pre-deal comfort on their 
planned business arrangements.4 All of this suggests that the 
approval of the settlement agreement by the court should not cause 
some sort of antitrust immunity to attach to the agreement. Under 
the current caselaw, there is some risk of that and Google and the 
Authors Guild will clearly argue for such immunities after the fact. 
The district court considering the agreement might minimize that 
risk by expressly providing in an order approving the settlement 
agreement that no antitrust immunities will attach from the court’s 
approval of the agreement—a no Noerr clause as it were.5 
                                                
4 28 C.F.R. 50.6. For more info, see Instructions (online at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/201659b.htm). 
5 See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 
508 U.S. 49 (1993); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1985). 
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I .  B r i e f  B a c k g r o u n d  t o  t h e  S e t t l e m e n t  
Books are the quintessential copyrighted works. The 1790 
Copyright Act—the U.S.’s first federal copyright statute—
addressed “any map, chart, book or books.”6 And copying a book—
in its entirety—is exactly the sort of act that we would think would 
run afoul of most copyright laws. Of course, a project such as the 
one envisioned by Google—the world’s information online—
would necessarily intersect with copyright laws across the planet 
and across time. To simplify considerably, such a project would 
necessarily confront three key situations. The first would relate to 
works in the public domain, that great repository of expression 
available to be drawn upon by anyone at any time. The second 
would relate to works of authors or publishers—whomever holds 
the copyright—who could easily be found. For those works, we 
might imagine that consent of some sort would be the appropriate 
vehicle for determining whether works were or were not in our 
online collection. The need for consent would of course be 
tempered by the doctrine of fair use—17 U.S.C. 107—which 
makes possible use of copyrighted works without the copyright 
holder’s permission in circumstances which are, to say the least, 
unclear. Third, an online database of books would need to figure 
out what to do about orphan works. These are works that remain 
within copyright—they have not entered the public domain—but 
where the copyright holder simply cannot be tracked down. These 
are not works that we can all draw upon—they are not in the 
public domain—nor works for which consent provides a simple 
sorting mechanism. 
Notwithstanding all of this, Google pressed forward.7 After 
doing preliminary work in 2002 and 2003, on October 7, 2004, 
Google announced its new Google Print Service at the Frankfurt 
                                                
6 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
7 History of Google Book Search (online at 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/history.html), 
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Book Fair.8 More than a dozen publishers had agreed to 
participate in the new service which would bring their books into 
the Google search engine. Google would provide limited online 
access to chunks of the books—snippets—while linking to places 
to buy the books. Two months later, Google announced that it was 
working with libraries of Harvard, Stanford, the University of 
Michigan and the University of Oxford and the New York public 
library to scan their collections and to bring them online.9 
Michigan made clear that the ambition of the project was to add 
all of the 7 million volumes in the Michigan library to the Google 
search engine and to, in the words of University of Michigan 
president Mary Sue Coleman, launch an era “when the printed 
record of civilization is accessible to every person in the world with 
Internet access.”10 
On September 20, 2005, the Authors Guild brought a class 
action suit against Google alleging copyright infringement relating 
to the copying of books from the Michigan library.11 A month 
later, five publishing companies brought a similar action against 
Google. Fast forward three years.12 On October 28, 2008, the 
Authors Guild, the Association of American Publishers and 
Google announced a settlement to the pending lawsuits.13 That 
                                                
8 Edward Wyatt, New Google Service May Strain Old Ties in Bookselling, New 
York Times, Oct 8, 2004 (online at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/08/technology/08book.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=google
%20frankfurt%20book%20fair%202004&st=cse). 
9 Google Checks Out Library Books, Google Press Release, Dec 14, 2004 (online at 
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html). 
10 Google/U-M project opens the way to universal access to information, University 
of Michigan News Service, Dec 14, 2004 (online at 
http://www.umich.edu/news/?Releases/2004/Dec04/library/index). 
11 The complaint is available online at 
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.attachment/authors-
guild-v-google/Authors%20Guild%20v%20Google%2009202005.pdf. 
12 Available online at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-
resources.attachment/mcgraw-hill/McGraw-Hill%20v.%20Google%2010192005.pdf. 
13 Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark Settlement, Press Release, 
Oct 28, 2008 (online at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-
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settlement agreement, now pending in federal district court in New 
York, will create a comprehensive new regime for online access to 
United States books. A fairness hearing will be held on the 
proposed settlement on June 11, 2009 and, before that date, class 
members who wish to opt out must do so by May 5, 2009.14 
I I .  F i v e  H y p o s  
In might be useful to frame the GBS settlement by considering 
five hypothetical cases. 
1. Poodle Book Quote. An entrepreneur—let’s call the company 
Poodle—buys a physical copy of every book ever written. 
Customers call an 800 number to ask about book quotes. In 
response to an inquiry, human beings scurry around a vast 
warehouse of books looking for quotes. Poodle initially charges a 
modest fee for the service but it is a hit with consumers and, facing 
no competition, Poodle jacks up its prices, enjoying the benefits of 
monopoly power. 
What do copyright and antitrust say about this? Nothing, I 
think. Poodle has purchased books, not made copies of them, and 
the use that Poodle is making of the books almost certainly falls 
within traditional notions of fair use. As to antitrust, Poodle has 
acted on its own and has created a great product with a 
corresponding market power through successful competition in the 
marketplace. Antitrust does not condemn this.15 Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court put it in its most recent antitrust decision “[s]imply 
possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does 
                                                                                                           
resources.attachment/press_release_final_102808/press_release_final_102808.pdf.) 
14 See Authors Guild v. Google Settlement Resources Page (online at 
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.html). 
15 As Judge learned hand famously put it in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (1945): “A single producer may be the survivor out of a 
group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. 
In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose the 
public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those 
very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” 
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not violate §2 … .”16 Tweak this case slightly. Switch from 
purchased physical copies to digitized copies and have the quotes 
returned by a computing system algorithmically rather than by 
human beings. Given the massive copying through digitization, 
the copyright issues are quite different, but I see no change in the 
antitrust analysis of the situation. 
2. Digital Book Rights. An author writes a book, publishes it on 
paper and retains the copyright. An entrepreneur approaches our 
author and seeks a license to sell digital copies of the book. Where 
do we stand? Our author starts with the full set of rights assigned 
to her by the Copyright Act. Those are statutorily defined rights—
start with Section 106—and those rights are limited in some cases 
by compulsory statutory licenses and by the uncertain but 
overriding rules of fair use. But none of those rights limit her 
ability to license whatever rights she has to a third party; indeed, 
the Copyright Act contemplates such transactions and sets out 
basic rules governing them.17 This transaction poses no copyright 
issues and we should think as such also poses no antitrust issues. 
Neither copyright nor antitrust insists that an author on her own 
exploit all of the uses of her work. Put differently, she need not 
vertically integrate into all fields where her work might be used. If 
she prefers to license the right to someone else to exploit her work 
in a particular medium, she is fully entitled to do so under 
copyright law and nothing in antitrust should foreclose this. 
Moreover, copyright law does not create an obligation for her to 
license her work to a second person merely because she licensed it 
to a first person. If JK Rowling chooses to allow a movie to be 
made of her latest Harry Potter novel, she does not need to license 
all comers who might like a chance to make competing versions of 
that movie. 
                                                
16 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. ___ 
(2009). 
17 17 U.S.C. 201-204. 
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3. Digital Books Cartel. One hundred authors—all of the 
authors in our little universe—write novels, publish them on paper 
and retain copyright to their individual works. They compete 
vigorously in the offline space with each author setting the price 
for his work. But as they approach a new medium—digital copies 
of works—they get together to implement a centralized sale 
system. In that medium, they set a uniform price for each work of 
$9.99. What does copyright law or antitrust law say about the 
situation? Again, copyright law proper says very little about this. 
Each author would be entitled to exploit her copyright in the new 
medium. We do see occasional nods towards the doctrine of 
copyright misuse, which clearly embraces some notion of 
competitive harm as a within-copyright limitation, but the 
application of that is typically quite uncertain.18 But antitrust law is 
ready to address this situation, as this is classic price-fixing in 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Price-fixing remains one 
of the few behaviors that is per se illegal under Section 1.19 That 
means that no further inquiry is required into market structure or 
actual market harm.  
4. Author Book Quote. Return to the first case, but change the 
facts. Instead of Poodle buying physical books, the 
authors/rightsholders get together as a group, digitize copies of 
their books, and put these online as a searchable quote service. 
Access to individual books is sufficiently limited that we would not 
think of the online access as a substitute for purchasing a physical 
copy of the book. The service is a quote service, with charges per 
quote or with some sort of unlimited use blanket-license fee. 
Again, there should be no copyright issues here assuming that 
the authors control their own copyrights. As to antitrust, we are 
now edging close to something like ASCAP or BMI, where we are 
nearing seventy years of antitrust regulation of those copyright 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass’n, 
121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). 
19 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998) (citing cases). 
Randal C. Picker The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? 
Thursday, April 16, 2009  Page 11 
collectives. Now alter this case slightly and consider a few key 
questions. They authors conclude that they don’t want to enter the 
book quote business as they don’t believe that search is their 
comparative advantage. But they do form a joint digital rights 
licensing group with the thought that they will then license those 
digital rights to firms that want to enter the book quote market. 
How many licenses would such a monopoly seller want to 
grant? One to, in my hypo, Poodle? More than one? A license to 
any entrant in the book quote business? How do we think that 
book-right licensing would work if the authors could not proceed 
collectively but instead were required to act individually? Would 
that alter the number of book quote entrants who would be able to 
obtain access to some digital rights? 
5. Monopoly by Statute. Poodle approaches Congress and asks it 
to enact the “Online Book Quote Monopoly Act of 2009.” Under 
the bill, Poodle would be the only company permitted to offer an 
online book quote service. Congress passes the act. This would 
almost certainly be bad policy, but that isn’t the same thing is an 
antitrust violation. We have been reluctant to create antitrust 
roadblocks to efforts to petition the government. Firms can pursue 
anti-competitive ends through the legal process. We could try to 
control those efforts through antitrust or we can give free flow to 
these forces consistent with fundamental First Amendment values. 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine creates a broad antitrust immunity 
that protects efforts to seek competitive benefits from the 
government.20 
I I I .  T h e  G B S  S e t t l e m e n t  
These five cases provide natural starting points for analyzing the 
settlement agreement currently under consideration in the class-
action suit by the Authors Guild against Google for Google’s book 
search service. The actual service provided is substantially more 
complicated than my examples and the settlement agreement 
                                                
20 See supra note 5. 
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infinitely more complex but we need starting points and these five 
examples should do the trick. 
A. Key Structural Components 
We should start by identifying key structural components of the 
settlement: 
Key Elements of Settlement
Digital Files 
Collection
Rightsholders
& Registry
Rights 
License
Orphan 
Holders
Active 
Holders
 
Google has set out to create a collection of digital files. It has done 
this through scanning books from a variety of sources but the two 
key sources are those that come from the Google Partner Program 
(1.62) and the Google Library Project (1.61). This allows Google 
to create Google Book Search (1.60 and 2.1(a)) which encapsulates 
the full variety of uses of the books that it has digitized. 
Without licenses from rightholders, it isn’t clear what Google 
could do with its digital collection. Google might have litigated a 
fair use claim to limit its exposure for copyright infringement, but 
it has instead chosen to seek licenses to use its amassed digital files. 
The settlement agreement itself operates as a rights license. That 
license sits between Google, as owner of its digital files collection, 
and the rightsholders and the registry which the settlement creates 
to act on behalf of the rightsholders. As to the rightsholders, we 
can usefully divide them into active holders and orphan (inactive) 
holders. 
We might think of the settlement agreement as two related 
deals neatly fused together. The class action itself is an opt out 
class-action and therefore any rightsholder who chooses to opt out 
neither enjoys the benefits of the settlement agreement nor is 
Randal C. Picker The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? 
Thursday, April 16, 2009  Page 13 
subject to its terms (17.33). Of course, opt out is an active step and 
the class action mechanism allows Google to sidestep neatly the 
problem of orphan works, as the holders of those works 
presumably will not opt out of the settlement. An orphan holder 
who shows up and opts out of the settlement is no longer an 
orphan, as we can now match the right in question with a 
particular individual. 
Active rights holders can embrace the settlement as is or opt 
out in toto. But opt out is only one way in which the collection can 
be limited. The agreement contemplates a removal mechanism 
(1.124, 3.5(a)) to remove individual works from Google’s 
collection. The right to remove is time-limited and expires at the 
end of 27 months after the notice commencement date (3.5(a)(iii)). 
There is also a partial removal mechanism, which allows 
rightholders to exclude a work from particular display uses or 
revenue models (3.5(b)). These mechanisms are substantially more 
complicated than this quick summary suggests, as the agreement 
makes an effort to ensure that books made available generally to 
consumers are also included in institutional subscriptions—the so-
called “coupling requirement” (3.5(b)(iii))—but I will avoid most 
of these details here.  
The definition of “Book” (1.16) is fundamental both for what it 
tells us about the works covered by the settlement and for what it 
says about how Google Book Search will evolve after the 
settlement is in place. The definition covers written or printed 
United States works (as defined in the Copyright Act)21 that have 
been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office and published 
before the Notice Commencement Date (1.94), which is January 5, 
2009, the date of the first notice of the class action settlement. The 
definition then excludes, among other things, periodicals, music 
books, works in the public domain and governmental works. 
Two key points there. The settlement is first backwards 
looking. That is exactly what we would expect for past damages, if 
                                                
21 17 U.S.C. 101. 
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any of course, but the settlement also will put in place licenses for 
the use of these works going forward but only for books that are 
registered U.S. books before January 5, 2009. That sounds like 
Google Book Search isn’t really a library of all books ever written 
but just those published in the United States before early-2009. A 
great resource to be sure, but one frozen at a point in time. That 
takes us naturally to the second point: Google will add content to 
GBS through separately negotiated contracts. That shows up most 
directly in the settlement agreement in the Google Partner 
Program (1.62), which contemplates exactly these sort of contracts. 
To put the point slightly differently, Google must contract going 
forward to continue to add to its collection and active rightsholders 
can opt of out of the settlement entirely and instead pursue 
separate contracts with Google. The group that can’t do that of 
course are the inactive rightsholders—the holders of rights to the 
orphan works—and a settlement cut off in early-2009 will 
encompass all of the preexisting orphan works. 
These are the two deals fused together. Active rightholders can 
effectively embrace simultaneous contracts with Google pursuant 
to the terms of the settlement or can opt out and seek to execute 
separate deals with Google. Orphan rightholders won’t do 
anything and the settlement agreement will make it possible for 
Google, and really only Google, to put those works to use. 
That leaves our third building block, the Registry (1.123 and 
all of Article VI). We have the digital files and the licensing 
regime that the agreement creates for those files, but the 
agreement also create a new institution—the Registry—to manage 
many of the aspects of the settlement agreement. The Registry will 
act as a middleman between the rightholders and Google. That is 
both about channeling money (6.1(d), 6.3) but also about 
managing the information that will be necessary to make this new 
complicated apparatus work (6.5, 6.6). 
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B. Use of Digital Copies 
We should pay some attention to who gets a digital copy of a book 
and how it can be used. Google will make a digital copy of a book 
available to the rightsholder (typically, the author or the publisher) 
(3.11). Google will also create a digitized works collection known 
as the Research Corpus and two or three sites will host it (1.130, 
7.2(d)). Libraries that have been the source of the works that make 
their way into Google’s collection will have the chance to receive 
back a digital copy (the Library Digital Copy (1.78)). The 
agreement is a little more complex than that. Cooperating 
Libraries (1.36) make books available to Google but don’t take 
back digital copies. In contrast, Fully Participating Libraries (1.58) 
received back digital copies—subject to extensive and complex 
restrictions (7.2(a))—and can make a specified set of uses of those 
files (7.2(b), 7.2(c)). The breadth or narrowness of those uses 
depends on where you sit obviously, but it seems hard to think that 
these uses, taken individually or in toto, will amount to meaningful 
competition to GBS itself. 
It is clear that Google thinks of these digital files as such as 
belonging to Google, as the agreement limits the rights of 
rightsholders and the Registry to authorize the use of digital copies 
made by Google (3.12, 6.6(b)). Google is authorized to make 
Display Uses and Non-Display Uses of the works that make it into 
GBS (2.2). Display Uses (1.48) turn on the business models 
embraced in the settlement agreement. Non-Display Uses (1.91) 
are at least as interesting, indeed perhaps even more so.22 Google 
will be able to draw upon the digitized works to do internal 
research to improve its core search algorithms—the crown jewel of 
Google’s business—and to develop new services, such as much-
improved automatic transaction services. 
Google’s competitors will not fare as well. They might turn to 
the research corpus but the agreement puts substantial limits on 
                                                
22 See Fred von Lohmann, Google Book Search Settlement: A Reader’s Guide 
(online at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/10/google-books-settlement-readers-
guide). 
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the sort of research that can be done. The research corpus brings 
together two overlapping sets of claims, namely, those of Google 
to the digital files as files it has created through its scanning efforts 
and then those of the rightsholders to the copyrighted works 
embedded in the digital files. The research corpus is to form the 
basis for what the agreement calls “Non-Consumptive Research” 
(1.90). That is research that is “not research in which a researcher 
reads or displays substantial portions of a Book to understand the 
intellectual content presented within the Book.” Not reading the 
book to understand it but instead the use of the book for non-
content understanding research. The definition sets forth five 
examples of research that might qualify, including research on 
automatic translation; indexing and search; linguistic analysis and 
others. This is exactly the sort of research that we should anticipate 
that Google will perform internally on GBS as part of its right to 
engage in Non-Display Uses. 
The agreement limits the extent to which third parties can do 
this research. For-profit commercial “use of information extracted 
from Books” is barred, unless Google and the Registry consent to 
it (7.2(d)(viii)). That would seem to prevent the extraction of say, 
baseball statistics, to provide a fantasy baseball service. Moreover, 
the agreement expressly limits the use of “data extracted from 
specific Books” “to provide services to the public or a third party 
that compete with services offered by the Rightsholders of those 
books or by Google” (7.2(d)(ix)). That said, commercial 
exploitation of algorithms developed in doing research on the 
research corpus is permitted (7.2(d)(x)). There may be some very 
fine lines being drawn here. Does algorithmic improvement count 
as information extracted from books? If so, Google would seem to 
have the power to block its competitors; if not, the settlement 
agreement seems to permit this sort of improvement, assuming of 
course that a prospective researcher can become a “Qualified User” 
(1.121). The use of the research corpus is limited, in the main, to 
such users (7.2(d)(iii)). Google competitors won’t easily qualify—
researchers based at U.S colleges and universities, non-profits and 
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the government are covered directly—and both the Registry and 
Google must consent for a for-profit entity to so qualify. 
It isn’t unusual for firm a firm to condition access to its 
property in a way that limits subsequent competition. For example, 
federal patent law makes it possible for a patent holder to limit the 
assignability of a license that it grants to another person. Absent 
the limit on assignment, the recipient of a license could 
immediately compete with the patent holder in the power to 
deliver a license to a third party. The patent holder would just 
create a new license for the third party but the original licensee 
could deliver its license to the third party if licenses were freely 
assignable. Federal patent law makes it possible for the original 
patent holder to bar assignment and avoid that competition.23 To 
take a second example, courts sometimes enforce limits on reverse 
engineering of software. The limit on reverse engineering is again 
intended to limit the ability of the recipient of a work to compete 
with the originator of that work.24 
All of that suggests that the limitations imposed by Google on 
the use of the digital files it has created are broadly consistent with 
the types of downstream limits on subsequent uses that we see in 
other circumstances. As to the rightsholders, the only wrinkle is 
that they are proceeding collectively in limiting that downstream 
competition. Were the rightsholders to proceed individually rather 
than collectively, we might very well see more competition as to 
the uses as to which the works could be put. 
Again, this matters most for the orphan works. The settlement 
agreement is non-exclusive (2.4) so a downstream user wishing to 
use a copyrighted work could contract directly with an active 
rightsholder. The fact that settlement agreement pushes towards a 
default position in which the rightsholders will have moved 
simultaneously in limiting downstream competition may make it 
easier to limit that subsequent contracting. And of course 
                                                
23 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996). 
24 Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
Randal C. Picker The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? 
Thursday, April 16, 2009  Page 18 
subsequent contracting isn’t possible as to the orphan works. But 
even if we do see direct contracts with active rightsholders, those 
holders presumably can’t contract as to the digital files that Google 
has created. The rightsholder can contract as to the copyrighted 
work, but the digital file itself is a separate matter.25 
C. Business Models 
The settlement agreement contemplates a number of different 
business models and also contemplates that those business models 
may change over time. To simplify considerably, focus on 
institutional subscriptions and consumer purchases. Institutional 
subscriptions are akin to the blanket licenses that we have seen in 
ASCAP and BMI. A standard institutional subscription will give 
access to the entire body of digitized works, but for any particular 
work in that group, access will be limited. The agreement 
contemplates a high-transactions costs approach to limiting uses, 
meaning that it will circumscribe the ability to copy, paste and 
print. You can get at small chunks easily but they will try to make 
it difficult to aggregate those chunks into something that would 
compete directly with the traditional offline physical book (4.1(d)). 
Institutional subscriptions will be priced usually on FTEs—
full-time equivalency—meaning, in the case of academic 
institutions, the number of full-time equivalent students 
(4.1(a)(iii)). At what price exactly? The settlement offers pricing 
objectives (4.1(a)(i)) that will result simultaneously in the 
realization of market rates for the books in the collection and in 
broad access to those books. That may require squaring the circle, 
                                                
25 It isn’t clear to me whether the settlement agreement makes a Host Site an owner 
of the Research Corpus. There is a mechanism for removing works from the Research 
Corpus (7.2(d)(iv)), but that could just mean that the Host Site holds title, but a 
defeasable one, to the copy in the question. What turns on this could be the application 
of the first-sale doctrine (17 U.S.C. 109(a)), though that doctrine seems to contemplate 
sale or other dispossession of the copy in question and wouldn’t seem to free the Host 
Site from the licensing limits of the settlement agreement. 
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but it is clear that many fear that Google will ultimately charge 
monopoly prices for these institutional subscriptions.26 
But antitrust law proper may not forbid this. If we treat Google 
as having as having obtained its monopoly through a risky, 
entrepreneurial undertaking and therefore legitimately then, as the 
Supreme Court said most recently in Linkline, Google can charge 
monopoly prices without facing Section 2 liability. Of course, 
Google’s “monopoly” status is seemingly being created by the 
ability of the rightsholders to act collectively. Were they acting 
separately, there is every reason to think that we would end up 
with Google and other firms competing to license from individual 
rightsholders. That would result in more competition and more 
fragmentation. 
And of course, on this framing, Google would also be the 
victim of the exercise of monopoly power and not just a 
perpetrator. The rightsholders would have combined horizontally 
to become the sole source of rights and would have chosen to issue 
only one license. To be sure, Google would have the right to use 
the copyrighted works and would be the only firm dealing with 
end users, but Google presumably would have paid dearly for that 
monopoly franchise in the deal cut with the rightsholders. If we 
hold an auction for a monopoly franchise, we will clearly suffer 
from the downstream harms of monopoly but all of the monopoly 
profits should be competed away in the auction and should inure to 
the benefit of the auctioneer, here the rightsholders. The actual 
situation is even more complex because we think that the auction 
winner will use what it learns in the direct market in adjacent 
markets. That is, as noted before, many believe that the Non-
Display Uses of the book collection will benefit Google in its core 
                                                
26 As Harvard Librarian Robert Darnton has put it “… Google will enjoy what can 
only be called a monopoly—a monopoly of a new kind, not of railroads or steel but of 
access to information.” Google will “first, entice subscribers with low initial rates, and 
then, once they are hooked, ratchet up the rates as high as the traffic will bear.” Robert 
Darnton, Google & the Future of Books, New York Review of Books, Feb. 12, 2009 
(online at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22281). 
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search businesses. The rightsholders would love to access a cut of 
that incremental value and, again, in an auction process for a single 
rights franchise, we should expect some of the incremental value in 
adjacent markets to flow to the rightsholders.  
The agreement’s second core business model is Consumer 
Purchases (1.32 and 4.2). This seems to contemplate online 
reading of a particular text with controlled copying, pasting and 
printing. The pricing mechanism for this access is interesting and 
seemingly problematic. Books made available this way will be 
priced either at the price set by the rightsholder or through a 
mechanism run by Google. The agreement defines a “Settlement 
Controlled Price” (1.143 and 4.2(b)(i)(2)). Books will be slotted 
into particular pricing bins and indeed the agreement contemplates 
an initial distribution of prices across bins: 5% of the books will be 
priced at $1.99, 10% at $2.99 and so forth until we reach a final 5% 
to $29.99 (4.2(c)(ii)). How does this match up with what we think 
would emerge under standard competition? I am not sure, as that 
seems to turn on a sense of exactly how spatial competition works, 
but I don’t think that we can be particularly confident that this 
centralized spacing approach matches what would emerge from 
normal, decentralized competition. 
Then turn to the pricing mechanism itself. Google is to create 
a “Pricing Algorithm” that Google is to “design to find the optimal 
such price for each Book and, accordingly, to maximize revenue for 
each Rightsholder” (4.2(b)(ii)). That isn’t what we expect 
competitive pricing to do. Competition drives down prices to costs 
and doesn’t have the effect of maximizing revenues to individual 
competitors. The rightholders are collectively appointing Google 
as their agent to implement pricing rules for Consumer Purchases 
that do not seem to mimic what we would see in pure 
decentralized competition. In that sense, it works its way towards 
tracking my digital book cartel hypo in Section II above. 
The agreement also recognizes that new revenue models might 
emerge and contemplates that Google and the Registry will 
negotiate the terms for any new models that might emerge (4.7). 
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Finally, the agreement creates a limited, free public access service. 
That service has been understandably criticized for being quite 
narrow27—one terminal for every 10,000 students at college, for 
example (4.8(a)(i)(1))—and one terminal in public libraries 
(4.8(a)(i)(3)). 
D. Who Gets the Money and Unclaimed Funds 
Focus next on the money. To track the agreement, start with the 
big picture and then head into the still-very-important details. 
Google will pay at least $45 million in cash into the settlement 
fund, plus another $34.5 million to get the Registry up and 
running, plus attorneys fees for the plaintiffs on top of that. On a 
going forward basis, this is a percentage of revenues deal. Google is 
to pay the Registry on behalf of the rightsholders 70% of the 
revenues earned by Google less ten percent for Google’s operating 
costs, resulting in a split of 63% to rightsholders and 37% of 
revenues to Google (2.1(a)).28 
That is a good starting point but there are some subtleties and 
they may matter for the overall incentives of the parties. We need 
to track what the agreement does with regard to revenues 
associated with public domain works and orphan works. Start with 
the public domain. The definition of “Book” (1.16) is one of the 
key linchpins of the settlement agreement and that definition 
excludes public domain works. That should have the effect of 
excluding public domain works from the revenues that would flow 
to copyright holders. GBS will undoubtedly generate revenues 
                                                
27 Jennifer Howard, Harvard Says No Thanks to Google Deal for Scanning In-
Copyright Works, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Oct. 30, 2008 (online at 
http://chronicle.com/news/article/?id=5417&utm_source=at&utm_medium=en).  
28 To track the agreement with more detail, Section 4.5(a) defines a standard 
revenue split for purchases as 70% of Net Purchase Revenues. The definition of that in 
turn (1.87) makes clear that those are all revenues received by Google from all revenue 
models other than advertising, less the 10% operating cost deduction. There are parallel 
provisions for advertising revenues (4.5(a)(ii) and 1.86) though the fact that there are 
parallel provisions rather than one unified provision suggests that I may be missing some 
subtle difference between the two. 
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from public domain works and Google will keep all of those 
revenues. Indeed, the agreement specifically addresses the 
possibility of mistaken payments by Google with regard to public 
domain works (6.3(b)). All of that certainly matches one vision of 
how the public domain works: anyone can use it as they wish and 
make or not make money on it. For fun sometime, go to Amazon 
and see how many different prices you will find for a work in the 
public domain. 
Turn next to the orphan works. The unclaimed funds provision 
(6.3(a)) is particularly important here because of the role that it 
plays in assigning revenues associated with those works. That 
provision creates different rules for subscription revenue and non-
subscription revenue. Recall that the revenue split in the deal is 
70%/30% subject to a 10% discount for Google’s operating costs 
resulting in a net 63%/37% deal. The unclaimed funds provisions 
make it possible for active rightsholders to get a version of 70% 
instead of the 63%. Unclaimed funds from non-subscription 
revenue models are paid first to some of the costs of the Registry 
and after that to active rightsholders—those who have become 
Registered Rightsholders—until payments reach 70% of the 
revenues for their books (6.3(a)(i)). That is a 7% carrot and is 
funded by revenues that arise from orphan works. For revenues 
that arise from the subscription model, there is a separate Plan of 
Allocation (6.3(a)(ii) and Attachment C) but, again, unclaimed 
funds from orphan works will fund additional payments to active 
rightsholders (Att. C, 1.1(e)). 
The net effect of the agreement, bolstered by the unclaimed 
funds provisions, is to turn orphan works into a kind of private 
public domain. Google will be able to use the orphan works in 
GBS and both Google and the active rightsholders will benefit 
from the revenues that arise from those works. This is a common 
strategy of parties selling intellectual property suits: it is in their 
joint interest to preserve a property right as against the world. 
We’ve seen this pattern before in suits between Lexis and Westlaw 
regarding the status of page numbers in the West reporting system 
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and in settlements between patent holders in generic entrants in 
the context of the Hatch-Waxman statute.29 
I V .  M u l t i p l y i n g  L i c e n s e s ?  
We should turn to the question of how many licenses are likely to 
be granted to use the orphan works. Recall hypo 4 from Section II 
where the book authors collectivized and then licensed digital 
rights to Poodle. I asked then: how many licenses are likely to be 
granted and how does the fact that the authors are collectivizing 
influence that? How many licenses should we want to be granted? 
A. The Settlement Agreement’s Most Favored Nations Clause 
To get at this, start with the settlement agreement’s most favored 
nations clause set out in Section 3.8(a). MFNs are fairly common 
when deals are done sequentially. An initial contracting party 
believes that its original agreement will make it possible for its 
counterparty to enter into other deals with third parties. The 
original deal may prove the concept and build a blueprint—or at 
least a starting point—for subsequent deals. An MFN ensures that 
the beneficiary of it shares in the incremental value that will accrue 
to its counterparty in other deals and may serve as an important 
inducement to do the deal in the first place. If potential deal 
partners believe that there is a second mover advantage, each 
partner will hang back and hope that another partner moves first. 
That logic results in no deals at all—you can’t ever be a second 
mover if there is a never a first mover. The MFN helps to solve 
that dynamic problem. 
But MFNs can also reduce future competition. A second 
mover knows that any benefits that it negotiates for will redound 
to the benefit of the first actor. The second mover knows that it is 
harder for it to gain a competitive advantage over the first actor 
and that reduces its incentives to compete to do so in the first 
                                                
29 Stephen Labaton, Westlaw and Lexis Near Truce, The New York Times, July 
19, 1988 (online at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/19/business/westlaw-and-lexis-
near-truce.html); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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place. And for the party granting the MFN, it knows that any 
benefit it gives to a later contracting party costs it double, not just a 
cost in the deal with the second actor but also in the original deal 
with the beneficiary of the MFN. All of this makes clear why 
MFNs are tricky and probably hard for us to just embrace wholly 
or seek to forbid. 
The actual MFN set out in Section 3.8(a) is interesting.30 The 
MFN protects Google from better deals down the road in the 
standard fashion that MFNs operate. But what is more interesting 
is that the MFN seems to suggest that the Registry might be able 
to grant licenses to other third parties. The trigger for the MFN is 
a deal better than the one that Google is getting in the settlement 
agreement sometime in the next ten years and that includes “rights 
granted from a significant portion of Rightsholders other than 
Registered Rightsholders.” That is, a deal about orphan works. But 
who is going to cut that deal for the orphan works? Google’s MFN 
right is keyed to a deal by the Registry itself or by any substantially 
similar entity organized by the rightsholders. The MFN certainly 
operates most naturally in a context where the Registry is 
understood to have the authority to issue additional licenses for the 
orphan works. 
Two other provisions in the settlement agreement might bear 
on this. The organizational structure provision for the Registry, 
6.2(b), provides that the Registry “will be organized on a basis that 
allows the Registry, among other things, to … (iii) to the extent 
permitted by law, license Rightsholders’ U.S. copyrights to third 
                                                
30 3.8(a) Effect of Other Agreements. The Registry (and any substantially similar 
entity organized by Rightsholders that is using any data or resources that Google 
provides, or that is of the type that Google provides, to the Registry relating to this 
Settlement) will extend economic and other terms to Google that, when taken as a whole, 
do not disfavor or disadvantage Google as compared to any other substantially similar 
authorizations granted to third parties by the Registry (or any substantially similar entity 
organized by Rightsholders that is using any data or resources that Google provides, or 
that is of the type that Google provides, to the Registry relating to this Settlement) when 
such authorizations (i) are made within ten (10) years of the Effective Date and (ii) 
include rights granted from a significant portion of Rightsholders other than Registered 
Rightsholders. … 
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parties.” And the settlement agreement extends some authority on 
its own terms for the Registry to act for rightsholders in executing 
agreements (6.7).31 
Those get close to the idea that the MFN contemplates—the 
Registry granting third parties licenses to use the orphan works—
but it isn’t clear that they get there fully. U.S. copyright law doesn’t 
generally authorize a third party to act on an author’s behalf, so it 
isn’t clear what 6.2(b)(iii) picks up. And the registry authorization 
clause—a power of attorney-type clause—doesn’t empower the 
Registry to act directly for orphan authors, unless perhaps we 
conclude that that idea is embedded itself in the MFN in Section 
3.8(a). 
B. Clarifying (?) the Settlement Agreement 
It seems possible that the settlement agreement intends for the 
Registry to be able to issue new licenses for the orphan works 
going forward. Again, it is hard to understand where the current 
version of Section 3.8(a) will work if the Registry can’t grant new 
orphan-works licenses. If that is indeed the intent of the 
settlement agreement, we should clarify 3.8(a) and probably make 
corresponding changes elsewhere in the agreement, perhaps to 
6.2(b)(iii), 6.7 and elsewhere. But I also think that there is a pretty 
good chance that the current version of the agreement doesn’t 
contemplate a going-forward licensing power for the orphan 
works. What should the court do about that in considering 
whether to approve the settlement agreement? 
We should start by assessing the incentives of the rightsholders 
to voluntarily license their digital works and in so doing also 
license the rights held by orphan holders. If we think that the 
                                                
31 6.7 Authorization of Registry. Where this Settlement Agreement confers on the 
Registry rights and obligations with respect to Books and Inserts, including with respect 
to the Registry’s relationship with each of Google, the Fully Participating Libraries, the 
Cooperating Libraries and the Public Domain Libraries, Plaintiffs and all Rightsholders, 
as of the Effective Date, shall be deemed to have authorized the Registry to exercise such 
rights and perform such obligations on behalf of the Rightsholders with respect to their 
respective Books and Inserts, including to enter into Library-Registry Agreements. 
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collection of rights represented in the lawsuit really is unique, then 
we should not think that the Authors Guild would wish to license 
them to a second online book search provider. The rights represent 
a monopoly and licensing use to two or more providers will result 
in competition between those providers and will almost certainly 
make the returns to the rights provider much lower. Indeed, in the 
extreme case—frequently captured in the notion of Bertrand price 
competition—we might expect multiple online book search service 
providers to compete price down to marginal cost which may be 
close to zero. 
If that is right, then the lawsuit by the Authors Guild and the 
proposed settlement agreement are themselves the vehicle to 
market power. The opt out class action increases the likelihood 
that the rightsholders will act collectively in large numbers by 
shifting the default position on contracting. This is to take the 
learning of behavioral economics on the importance of defaults and 
turn it into large-scale contracting to achieve market power. That 
probably works that way even for identifiable rightsholders but it 
clearly operates in that way as to orphan authors. Nothing would 
have prevented large numbers of rightsholders from entering into 
private contracts with Google to create something akin to GBS but 
the numbers—and the resulting market power—would clearly have 
been smaller without the switch in default settings made by the opt 
out class action. And what those private contracts could not have 
accomplished was bringing the orphan works into the deal, but the 
opt out class action settlement does just that. 
We would seem to have two natural approaches to changing 
the settlement agreement to ensure the possibility of competing 
digital books collections: (1) alter the settlement agreement now as 
part of the approval process to add additional licenses; or (2) ensure 
that the agreement contains a mechanism for new licenses to be 
considered going forward. Start with what those licenses might 
look like substantively. The current MFN gives Google the benefit 
of any other deals in the next ten years for new licenses of the 
orphan works. A fully symmetric MFN would make it possible for 
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other entities to get the licensing regime that Google gets for the 
works licensed by active rightsholders and for the orphan works. 
As to the latter, Google can use those fully and the release 
provisions in the settlement agreement (Article X) ensure that 
Google will not face liability for copyright infringement for its use 
of those works. Google will make payments to the Registry for the 
revenues that it derives from those works, just as it would any other 
work in GBS. And the Registry in turn distributes those revenues 
per the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Remember 
importantly that active rightsholders effectively benefit from the 
revenues generated by the orphan works. 
A symmetric MFN would allow qualified entities to sign up for 
the going-forward provisions of the settlement agreement as to 
both the works of the active rightsholders and the orphan works. 
That license would mitigate both the problem that the active 
rightsholders will be reluctant to issue additional licenses on their 
own for their works—why compete with themselves?—and the 
problem that the settlement represents the only way to gain access 
to the orphan works. Note of course that those rights licenses 
wouldn’t actually enable immediate entry into the book search 
business. Any entrant will have to do its own scanning as nothing I 
have said here would justify some sort of mandatory access to the 
scans that Google has created. We should want to foster 
competition in scanning. 
What does “qualified” mean? The rightsholders undoubtedly 
will emphasize that they cut a deal with Google, not any random 
entity. The rightsholders are relying on Google’s incentive to go 
out and make money and pay 63% of the revenues generated to the 
rightsholders. A non-profit wouldn’t have the same incentives to 
generate revenues. And the rightsholders will argue that they have 
negotiated for an elaborate protective scheme for the scans that 
Google has created (all of Article VIII and Attachment D). The 
rightsholders will understandably want a Google-class contracting 
partner if we are going to force them to Xerox the settlement 
agreement licenses and make those available to others. But those 
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limits shouldn’t mean that non-profits are completely left out. The 
revised MFN should separate out the orphan-works deal from the 
deal made by the active rightsholders—unbundle the orphan-
works license from the overall settlement—and make 
corresponding licenses (and releases) available to third-parties to 
use the orphan works. 
Active rightsholders might very well object to the Xeroxing of 
their deal to allow other firms access to licenses to use their works. 
But that would almost certainly reflect a desire to preserve the 
incremental market power that accrues to them from the ability to 
implement their deal with Google through the court system. 
Proceeding through the court system maximizes their ability to act 
collectively and it is that which shrinks the number of licenses 
granted to their works. If the active rightsholders were forced to 
act outside the court system, we would almost certainly see greater 
fragmentation in the licenses granted and more competition in 
book search. 
And the active rightsholders would seem to have little basis to 
object to the expansion of the MFN to encompass additional 
licenses of the orphan works. I understand that they might want to 
squelch the competition that might emerge if multiple firms had 
access to the orphan works. That competition could easily reduce 
overall industry revenues for digital book search services and that 
would be against the interest of the active rightsholders given that 
they are cutting deals tied to percentages of revenues. But 
eliminating competition can’t be seen as a legitimate goal of the 
collective action of the active rightsholders captured in the 
settlement agreement. Absent the lawsuit, the active rightsholders 
could convey no rights to anyone to the orphan works and we need 
to guard against their ability to create a monopoly as to those 
works by issuing only a single license to those works. 
The case against expanding the scope of the MFN now or 
ensuring a mechanism to issue additional licenses going forward 
might run as follows. Google undertook a substantial risk in 
digitizing works and putting them online. Even in proceeding 
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carefully by controlling the scope of access to the works, Google 
faced substantial liability for the core copying of entire works that 
made this possible. To be sure, Google could make arguments 
regarding the permissibility of intermediate copying and regarding 
fair use, but those arguments were far from a sure thing, plus 
Google was operating at a sufficient scale that were it to lose the 
damages would likely be substantial. 
In granting access to third parties to the rights regime created 
by the settlement agreement, we face a standard selection problem 
in that potential competitors are always eager to join in successful 
projects and share those costs, but rarely volunteer to fund those 
which have been revealed to be losers. That means that any notion 
of merely paying some measure of Google’s costs in creating the 
new licensing regime is inadequate in that those costs need to be 
grossed up for the risk of failure. 
If the settlement represents a clever solution to the orphan 
works problem, we could imagine a number of different 
approaches to follow-on efforts. One approach would require a 
subsequent entrant to pursue the same legal strategy. Of course, 
the path here was entry by Google followed by a class action 
lawsuit by the Authors Guild. As suggested before, it isn’t clear 
that the Authors Guild will want to grant a second collective rights 
license and that means a second suit might not ever be brought. Of 
course, the entrant might bring a declaratory judgment action 
naming as defendants the plaintiff class in the current litigation. 
But we should ensure that a subsequent entrant doesn’t face an 
entry barrier based on the inability of a court to obtain new 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis the orphan works or based on the 
unwillingness of active rightsholders to grant a second license to 
the orphan works. 
That would suggest a possible more limited approach to the 
settlement agreement: don’t create additional licenses in the 
settlement agreement now but make sure that some combination 
of the Registry and the court can do so going forward. As noted 
before, there is a reading of the settlement agreement that suggests 
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that the Registry can grant new licenses to orphan works under the 
current agreement. And we could make that more explicit in the 
agreement. Alternatively—or perhaps in addition—the settlement 
agreement provides that the district court will retain jurisdiction 
going forward (17.23). If that retained jurisdiction was understood 
to cover efforts by qualified firms to license works covered by the 
settlement agreement and to license separately the unbundled 
orphan works—perhaps thought of as intervening defendants in 
the original case—that might solve the fear that the Authors Guild 
might not sue again or that jurisdiction might not attach for a 
declaratory judgment action. 
V .  A n t i t r u s t  I m m u n i t i e s  a n d  t h e  T i m i n g  o f  a n  
A n t i t r u s t  I n q u i r y  
To get a handle on the question of timing, consider a 
counterfactual. Suppose that Google launched its service as it did 
and that the Authors Guild drafted a complaint identical to the 
one filed. But in this alternative universe, no lawsuit is filed. 
Google and the Authors Guild negotiate an arrangement identical 
to the settlement agreement but they do so without the 
intervention of litigation. Where would we stand and how does 
that differ from the current situation? 
A number of points matter. The arrangement between Google 
and the Authors Guild would simply be a matter of contract. 
Rightsholders who signed on the dotted line would become bound 
by the contract. Other rightsholders who declined the agreement 
would of course not be bound. No federal district court judge 
would have any role in approving the agreement. This would be 
purely a private matter and there would be no substantive review of 
the contract at the time of its execution. There would be no 
contemporaneous evaluation of whether the deal was fair as 
between the parties or what antitrust consequences might be of the 
new arrangement. There would of course be no possibility that 
some sort of Noerr-Pennington immunity would attach to the 
contract. Nor would there be a consideration of whether the 
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contracting rights holders were somehow sufficiently similar that 
they could sign the same contract. 
Now revert to the actual case. A lawsuit was filed: how does 
that change the analysis? The key point of course is that the nature 
of an opt out class-action means that the default setting as to 
whether or not the settlement is agreed to has changed. If a 
rightsholder does not affirmatively decline the contract, he or she is 
bound. That is the precise flip of the position we had in the 
counterfactual, and default positions, as behavioral economics is 
quick to point out, can matter enormously. 
We also will have the fairness hearing on the settlement, but 
the antitrust analysis in the settlement hearing on the class action 
is likely to be minimal to non-existent. Circuits differ in the factors 
that they consider in a fairness hearing, with some looking to many 
factors, including the public interest, with others—and probably 
the Second Circuit—focusing more narrowly on what the 
settlement means for the parties to the lawsuit.32 
Now we can frame the Noerr-Pennington point. In circuits that 
embrace a party-centered approach to fairness and class-action 
settlements, no possibility of subsequent Noerr-Pennington 
immunity for the court-approved agreement should attach. The 
court will not have considered what the competitive consequences 
would be of the arrangement and therefore clearly have engaged in 
no shaping or assessing of the agreement in those terms. This case 
should be treated as our counterfactual case would be were no 
complaint had been filed. That private contract enjoyed no 
immunity from antitrust inquiry and in similar fashion these court-
approved agreements should not either. And even in circuits that 
embrace a broader inquiry to fairness hearings, the antitrust 
                                                
32 As the Sixth Circuit framed its test in UAW v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 
615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007): “Several factors guide the inquiry: (1) the risk of fraud or 
collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of litigation; (3) the amount of 
discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the 
opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class 
members; and (7) the public interest.” 
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analysis is likely to be minimal. This suggests, again, that no 
Noerr-Pennington immunity should attach to the approval of these 
settlements.33 If the district court approves the settlement 
agreement, it should take the additional step of including a no 
Noerr clause in its order approving the settlement. That clause 
would provide that no antitrust immunities would attach to the 
settlement agreement from the court’s approval of it. 
C o n c l u s i o n  
Google boldly launched Google Book Search in pursuing its goal 
of organizing the world’s information. Even though Google was 
sensitive to copyright values, the service relied on mass copying and 
thus Google undertook a substantial legal risk in setting up the 
service. That risk was realized with the lawsuits by the Authors 
Guild and the Association of American Publishers. The October, 
2008 settlement agreement for those suits will create an important 
new copyright collective and will legitimate broad-scale online 
access to United States books registered before early January, 2009. 
The settlement agreement is exceeding complex but I have 
focused on three issues that raise antitrust and competition policy 
concerns. First, the agreement calls for Google to act as agent for 
                                                
33 Like most interesting propositions, the caselaw isn’t clear on whether Noerr-
Pennington immunity would attach to the court’s approval of the settlement agreement. 
The Supreme Court certainly didn’t allow a court consent decree to block additional 
antitrust inquiry into the arrangements in ASCAP and BMI. See Broadcast Music, Inc. 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“Of course, a consent 
judgment, even one entered at the behest of the Antitrust Division, does not immunize 
the defendant from liability for actions, including those contemplated by the decree, that 
violate the rights of nonparties.”). But more recent lower court decisions have clearly 
relied on Noerr-Pennington to block some challenges to court-approved arrangements. 
See Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 913 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protected a private party from antitrust liability from anti-
competitive harms resulting from tobacco settlement agreement negotiated with state 
entity but further declining to resolve whether that doctrine would insulate private parties 
from an anti-competitive settlement merely because that agreement was approved by a 
court). The Second Circuit has taken a narrower approach than most circuits to the scope 
of Noerr-Pennington immunity in the master settlement agreements for the tobacco 
litigation. See Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
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rightsholders in setting the price of online access to consumers. 
Google is tasked with developing a pricing algorithm that will 
maximize revenues for each of those works. Direct competition 
among rightsholders would push prices towards some measure of 
costs and would not be designed to maximize revenues. As I think 
that that level of direct coordination of prices is unlikely to mimic 
what would result in competition, I have real doubts about whether 
the consumer access pricing provision would survive a challenge 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Second, and much more centrally to the settlement agreement, 
the opt out class action will make it possible for Google to include 
orphan works in its book search service. Orphan works are works 
as to which the rightsholder can’t be identified or found. That 
means that a firm like Google can’t contract with an orphan holder 
directly to include his or her work in the service and that would 
result in large numbers of missing works. The opt out 
mechanism—which shifts the default from copyright’s usual out to 
the class action’s in—brings these works into the settlement. 
But the settlement agreement also creates market power 
through this mechanism. Absent the lawsuit and the settlement, 
active rightsholders could contract directly with Google, but it is 
hard to get large-scale contracting to take place and there is, again, 
no way to contract with orphan holders. The opt out class action 
then is the vehicle for large-scale collective action by active 
rightsholders. Active rightsholders have little incentive to compete 
with themselves by granting multiple licenses of their works or of 
the orphan works. Plus under the terms of the settlement 
agreement, active rightsholders benefit directly from the revenues 
attributable to orphan works used in GBS. 
We can mitigate the market power that will otherwise arise 
through the settlement by expanding the number of rights licenses 
available under the settlement agreement. Qualified firms should 
have the power to embrace the going-forward provisions of the 
settlement agreement. We typically find it hard to control prices 
directly and instead look to foster competition to control prices. 
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Non-profits are unlikely to match up well with the overall terms of 
the settlement agreement, which is a share-the-revenues deal. But 
we should take the additional step of unbundling the orphan works 
deal from the overall settlement agreement and create a separate 
license to use those works. All of that will undoubtedly add more 
complexity to what is already a large piece of work, and it may 
make sense to push out the new licenses to the future. That would 
mean ensuring now that the court retains jurisdiction to do that 
and/or giving the new Registry created in the settlement the power 
to do this sort of licensing. 
Third, there is a risk that approval by the court of the 
settlement could cause antitrust immunities to attach to the 
arrangements created by the settlement agreement. As it is highly 
unlikely that the fairness hearing will undertake a meaningful 
antitrust analysis of those arrangements, if the district court 
approves the settlement, the court should include a clause—call 
this a no Noerr clause—in the order approving the settlement 
providing that no antitrust immunities attach from the court’s 
approval. 
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